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ABSTRACT 
For a generation, the theory of critical elections has been 
a guiding research program for the study of American political history. 
As fashioned by such distinguished scholars as V. O. Key, Jr. , Angus 
Campbell, Walter Dean Burnham, and Paul Allen Beck, critical election 
theory posits that American democracy follows an episodic pattern of 
change and stability. According to the prevailing wisdom, one or more 
critical elections periodically reorganize coalitions of voters, 
create new balances of party power, and introduce policy initiatives 
that respond to unmet needs. Realignments, in this view, are not 
historical accidents, but processes built into the dynamics of party 
identification and governmental structure in the United States. 
Through a quantitative analysis of presidential election 
returns and party registration statistics (both measured for counties) , 
this paper will challenge the application of critical election theory 
to the realignments of the 1890s and the 1930s. The results of 
analysis show that in neither case did shifts in the electorate follow 
the pattern predicted by realignment theory. It also reveals 
significant differences in each of the two periods that question the 
application of a single theory to historical distinct episodes of 
political change. The paper also presents a situational logic to 
account for the capacity of incumbent parties to sustain their power 
over extended periods of time. 
CRITICAL ELECTIONS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Allan J. Lichtman 
For the past generation, the theory of critical elections has 
dominated studies of change and stability in American politics. As 
fashioned by political scientists such as V. 0. Key, Jr. , Angus 
Campbell, and Walter Dean Burnham, critical election theory posits 
that periodic realignments of voter loyalties are built into the 
historical dynamics of political competition in the United States. 
In this view, long stretches of stability in party power, voter 
coalitions, and public policy are disrupted periodically by one or 
more "critical elections" that introduce new eras of stability marked 
by an altered balance of party strength, reorganized coalitions of 
voters, and policy initiatives that respond to unmet needs. Thus 
American history neatly resolves into stable systems of party rivalry 
punctuated by the upheavals -- the critical elections -- that produce 
the transitions from one system to another. 1 
For most theorists, the party identification of voters is 
the key to explaining this pattern of regular, discontinuous change. 
Identification with a political party, the conventional wisdom relates, 
not only guides a voter's choice from among competing candidates but 
is so deeply integrated into the individual's psyche as to be highly 
resistant to change. For the electorate as a whole substantial shifts 
in the distribution of party allegiances occur only during the crises 
that produce critical elections and introduce new eras of stable 
politics. With a kind of foolproof logic, party identification 
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the "long-term" force behind voter decisions -- is posited as 
determining the outcome of elections except for such "deviating" cases 
as the Democratic victories of 1912 and 1916 and the Republican 
victories of 1952 and 1956. The results of deviating elections are 
attributed to the crosscutting influence of "short-term" forces unique 
to those contests and exogenous to the theory of critical elections 
itself. 
To account for the seeming periodicity of critical elections 
(according to prevailing views they should occur about every thirty to 
forty years), Burnham argues that America's social and economic 
development has significantly outpaced the evolution of its political 
institutions, yielding an inherent lag in the meeting of political 
demands. In his view, unmet needs continue to build until a crisis 
occurs and those needs are met through the redistribution of political 
power that accompanies one or more critical elections. In Burnham's 
words, "The periodic rhythm of American electoral politics, the cycle 
of oscillation between the normal and the disruptive corresponds 
precisely to the existence of largely unfettered developmental change 
in the socioeconomic system and its absence in the country's political 
institutions . • • .  Dysfunctions centrally related to this process 
become more and more visible . • • •  Then the triggering event occurs, 
critical realignment follow, and the universe of policy and electoral 
coalitions is broadly redefined.112 
Other political scientists such as Paul Allen Beck and 
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Kristi Andersen focus less on the importance of institutional arrangements 
and more on the dynamics of party identification itself. 3 In this 
generational interpretation of realignment, voters coming of age after 
the critical period do not possess strong allegiances to either of the 
prevailing parties since they are remote from the events in which 
powerful party identifications were initially forged. Thus realignment 
primarily involves not the conversion of already committed party 
loyalists, but the recruitment of younger voters who had either not 
previously bothered to vote or first reached voting age during the 
realigning era. The period just prior to realignment, moreover, is 
viewed as one of "dealigmnent, " in which party attachments are weak and 
voter participation is low. According to Beck, "the inexorable process 
of generational replacement produces variations in the composition of 
the electorate over time. When those who formed party loyalties in 
the crucible of realignment dominate the electorate . . . a period of 
stable alignment ensues . • • •  Once [this] generation begins to be 
displaced, underlying stresses in the party coalitions surface. 
The dealigning period ends when large numbers of young voters, 
unattached to the now-antiquated party system, are mobilized in a new 
realignment. 114 
The generational interpretation of party realignment, however, 
also depends on the inability of the American political system to meet 
ongoing voter demands. For realignments still arise only in the context 
of political crises; otherwise .the period of dealignment would 
definitely continue. 
As set forth in the form advanced either by Burnham or by 
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Beck, the theory of critical elections has profound implications for an 
understanding of American history. Scholars link electoral realignment 
to policy change, contending that major innovations in national policy 
occur only in the context of critical elections. According to Jerome 
Clubb, William H. Flanigan, and Nancy H. Zingale, "Most of us would 
agree, without demanding presentation of much in the way of detailed 
evidence, that these [realignment] periods were also times of major 
policy change • when the parties assumed well-defined and clearly 
opposing positions, when their positions constituted responses to 
recognized national issues and cleavages • • . •  The political patterns 
of the years following partisan realignments also convey a sense of 
similarity • . • as marked by ineffective and divided government, by 
unsolved -- indeed, unaddressed -- national problems, by dissatisfaction 
with the mechanism of government, and by incremental rather than 
innovative policy-making. 115 
Critical elections are also viewed as the means by which new 
groups are integrated into the mainstream of pluralist competition in 
the United States. Indeed, for some theorists, critical elections 
have become the ultimate fail-safe mechanisms of pluralist democracy. 
If, over time, normal political competition does not produce mutually 
satisfactory resolutions of the conflicting demands and needs of 
different groups, realignment occurs and the polity responds to the 
will of the people. "Critical realignment occurs approximately once 
in a generation, " notes Benjamin Ginsberg, "giving voters the 
opportunity to alter national policy significantly. Thus popular 
majorities appear, over time, to govern. 116 
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In sum, if the critical election model were correct, one 
would expect to find, descriptively, periodic realignments in the 
electoral strength of parties accompanied by shifts in the social and 
economic composition of party coalitions. This process should result 
not from historical accident, but from a dynamic inherent to the 
nature of party identification, the process of generational change, 
and the accumulation of unmet demands. Policy change should follow 
the rhythm set by electoral realignment, with innovation taking place 
only in times of realignment and stable periods marked by policy inertia. 
For the period since the Civil War, this paper will, in broad 
outline, challenge the above account of American history, suggesting 
that critical election theory may conceal more than it reveals about 
political experience. In particular, the inquiry will focus on 
realignment in the 1890s and the 1930s. 
V. O. Key, Jr. , in his 1955 article that introduced the 
notion of critical elections, identified two such presidential contests 
since the Civil War. First, McKinley's victory over Bryan in 1896 led 
to an era of Republican hegemony broken only by the "deviating" 
elections of 1912 and 1916. Second, in the presidential election of 
1928, the defeated Democrat, Al Smith, is said to have forged the 
political alignments that introduced FDR's New Deal coalition.7 
According to the prevailing wisdom, a national crisis, 
beginning with the advent of economic depression in 1893 and lasting 
through 1896, triggered a political realignment that reshuffled 
coalitions of voters and altered the balance of party power decisively 
in favor of the GOP. The dominant historical account of this 
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realignment arises from the work of "ethnocultural" historians such as 
Richard Jensen and Paul M. Kleppner, who contend that nineteenth-century 
voting reflects a clash of religious values between those dubbed 
"pietists" who sought to use the government as an instrument of moral 
reform, and those dubbed "liturgicals" who saw the fostering of morality 
as a matter between the communicant and his church, independent of 
state intervention" Politically, the Republicans were the party of 
morality and the bastion of the pietists, whereas the Democrats were 
the party of personal liberty and the stronghold of the liturgicals. 8 
Ethnocultural historians interpret the critical election of 
1896 not only as a reaction against the party in power during the 
depression, but also as a result of the Republican party's ability to 
modify their hard-line pietist image and offer voters a beneficent 
pluralism that could attract Democratic pietists. According to 
Jensen, "McKinley's new spirit of pluralism . • .  born of professional 
reaction to the defeats wrought by pietistic moralism inside the GOP . 
quickly set the tone of national and midwestern politics."9 The 
Republican embrace of pluralism, the ethnoculturalists argue, came 
precisely at the time that the Democrats nominated William Jennings 
Bryan -- a candidate whose own pietistic religious background and 
crusading campaign style would be more appealing to the Republicans' 
predominant pietist constituency than to the Democratic Party's own 
liturgicals. Thus the election of 1896, Kleppner maintains, produced 
a "two-way voter movement [marked by] the propensity of steadfastly 
anti-Democratic pietists to embrace Bryan's democracy and that of 
resolutely Democratic ritualists to reject it.1110 
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A major exception to the ethnocultural interpretation of the 
1896 election is Burnham's claim that McKinley's victory represented 
the triumph of a new industrial and financial elite seeking to control 
the "large and possibly dangerous mass electorate" of late nineteenth­
century America. 11 According to Burnham, the decline of two-party 
competition and the falling turnout that followed 1896 resulted in "the 
insulation of elites from attacks by the victims of an industrializing 
process, and corresponding reinforcement of political conditions 
favoring an exclusively private exploitation of the industrial economy.1112 
Unlike the ethnoculturalists, however, Burnham has not attempted a 
detailed study of the politics of the 1880s and 1890s. 
A predominantly ethnocultural orientation also guides accounts 
of the realigning sequence of elections alleged to begin in 1928 and 
end in 1936. Contradicting the view that ethnocultural conflict was 
dissolved in a new turn-of-the-century pluralism, scholars such as 
Samuel Lubell, John Allswang, and Kristi Andersen suggest that 
ethnocultural combat continued through the twentieth century, culminating 
in the 1928 contest between Hoover and Smith. Postponing the triumph 
of pluralism more than thirty years after 1896, historians argue that 
it was the political victory attained by the new immigrant America 
between 1928 and 1936 that blocked efforts to impose on the nation the 
moralism of small-town Protestant pietism. Henceforth, political 
leaders would concentrate on pragmatic solutions to immediate economic 
13 problems and give all groups access to the powers of government. 
In line with this account of the New Deal realignment, the 
source of political change is sought not only in the statistics of a 
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sagging economy, but primarily in tallies of the birthrates of the 
new immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe. The sons and daughters 
of the immigrants, drawn to the Democratic Party by Al Smith, became 
the backbone of the New Deal coalition as Roosevelt satisfied their 
yearning for political recognition and fashioned policies that seemed 
tailored to their needs. It was "a little matter of birth rates, " 
wrote Samuel Lubell. "Through the entire Roosevelt era the Republicans 
labored on the wrong side of the birth rate. Nor was there anything 
they could do about it, since the birth rates frustrating them were 
those of 1910 to 1920. "14 
Andersen offers recent confirmation of Lubell's analysis in 
a study of surveys taken between 1952 and 1972 that asked people to 
recall their history of party identification and voter behavior. 
Linking Lubell's version of the New Deal realignment with a generational 
interpretation of critical elections, Andersen contends that the 
Democrats gained few converts from among the Republican faithful, but 
were able to recruit vast numbers of new.loyalists from among previously 
apathetic and newly eligible voters, primarily foreign-stock .Americans. 
"If in fact the great political upheaval around the time of the New 
Deal (seen in terms of partisanship, that is) occurred mainly through 
mobilization of the non-immunized and replacement of the electorate 
rather than through conversion, the status of party identification as 
a 'secular religion' is greatly enhanced. In this view, even during 
the traumas of the Depression and the emergence of new bases of 
cleavage between the parties, individuals' partisan attachments 
remained relatively stable. "15 
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This study indicates that on several important accounts 
prevailing interpretations of both realignments are incorrect. First, 
there was no realignment of 1896 in the sense of reshuffled coalitions 
of voters. Despite the upheavals of the 1890s, the social bases of 
the two parties display considerable continuity from the 1880s through 
the 1920s. This means, of course, that the election of 1896 was not 
characterized by a major two-way movement of liturgicals and pietists 
across the nation's dominant parties. Second, the election of 1896 
resulted in neither the triumph of pluralism nor in newly-established 
control of the policy agenda by an economic elite. Third, New Deal 
politics did not begin in 1928 with an "Al Smith revolution" that 
mobilized the masses of urban, working-class, immigrant .Americans. 
Fourth, the New Deal realignment involved the substantial conversion 
of Republican loyalists as well as the recruitment of nonvoters and 
newly-eligible voters. This reanalysis of political realignment both 
revises our understanding of post-Civil War politics and challenges 
the precepts of critical election theory. 
If 1896 were a critical election that recast voter groupings, 
we would expect to find a distinctive pattern of stability and 
instability in party coalitions measured across pairs of elections. 
Pairs of elections selected from either before 1896, on the one hand, 
or from 1896 until the next critical election, on the other hand, 
should display little movement of voters across party coalitions. In 
contrast, pairs of elections selected by choosing one election from 
each period, should display considerable voter movement since a 
reshuffling of electoral groupings has allegedly occurred. 
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Typically, investigators have used correlation coefficients 
measures of how well the vote in one year for a set of units such as 
counties or states can predict the vote in a later year for the same 
units. The values of correlation coefficients, however, are extremely .·' 
sensitive to changes in factors such as the level of aggregation that 
have nothing to do with changes in the actual voter coalitions. In 
addition to reporting correlation coefficients, I have used a technique 
based on regression analysis to estimate defections from one party 
grouping to another. 16 After dividing voters into two groups -- those 
who voted for a particular party and those who did not -- this measure 
gives the mean rate of defection across the two groups. Depending on 
the purpose of analysis, such groupings may or may not include those 
eligible to vote who did not do so. If, for example, the two voter 
groups were Democratic and non-Democratic voters, the defection measure· 
would be the proportion of Democratic voters in Election 1 who became 
non-Democratic voters in Election 2, plus the proportion of non-Democratic 
voters in Election 1 who became Democratic voters in Election 2, divided 
by two, to get the mean defection rate. 
Mean Defection Rate DlD2 + DlD2 
2 
where DlD2 is the proportion of Democratic voters in Election 1 voting 
non-Democratic in Election 2, and DlD2 is the proportion of non-
Democratic voters in Election 1 who voted Democratic in Election 2. 
Tables 1, 2, and 3 report mean defection rates as well as 
traditional correlation measures for selected elections from 1888 to 
1928. The statistics are computed from election returns for all 
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TABLE 2 
MEAN DEFECTION RATIOS AND CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: DEMOCRATIC PERCENTAGE OF ADULT POPULATION 
% Democratic 1888 % Democratic 1896 % Democratic 1900 
Defection 2 Defection 2 Defection 2 
Rate r Rate r Rate r -- --
% Dem 1896 17 
• 23 
% Dem 1900 20 . 28 16 .6S 
% Dem 1904 14 
. so 27 .37 18 . 49 
% Dem 1908 14 .38 19 .S2 6 .66 
% Dem 1912 18 . 36 23 .41 13 .S6 
% Dem 1916 19 .2S 33 .22 17 .34 
% Dem 1920 29 . 21 29 . 3S 12 .48 
% Dem 1924 2S .30 33 .2S 29 . 28 
% Dem 1928 37 .10 44 . 04 39 .12 
TABLE 3 
MEAN DEFECTION RATIOS AND CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: REPUBLICAN PERCENTAGE OF ADULT POPULATION 
% Republican 1888 % Republican 1896 % Republican 1900 
Defection 2 Defection 2 Defection 2 
Rate r Rate r Rate r --
% Rep 1896 10 . 31 
% Rep 1900 lS .43 20 .so 
% Rep 1904 12 . 43 23 .37 11 .S9 
% Rep 1908 8 .44 22 . 34 6 . S7 
% Rep 1912* 8 .37 22 . 28 8 .42 
% Rep 1916 26 .13 22 . 27 16 .26 
% Rep 1920 23 .32 3S .18 24 .30 
% Rep 1924 24 .28 36 .14 2S . 28 
% Rep 1928 21 . 32 36 .14 21 .32 
..... 
N 
..... 
..... 
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counties outside the states of the Confederacy. I will analyze only 
the defection rates, although the correlation coefficients tell 
essentially the same story. 
If 1896 were a critical election that recast voter alignments, 
we would expect to find high defection rates for the voter coalitions 
of 1888 and those of 1896 and all subsequent elections. For 1896 
marks the dividing line between what historians have termed America's 
third and fourth party systems. Likewise we should find substantially 
lower rates of defection for all elections beginning in 1896 and 
continuing throughout the fourth party system. 
The actual results confound these expectations, suggesting 
instead that the party system of the 1880s continues through the early 
twentieth century. Table 1, which lists defection rates for the 
Democratic percentage of the vote cast, reveals that after the upheavals 
associated with Bryan's candidacies in 1896 and 1900 (especially 1896) 
voter alignments returned to a pattern closely resembling that of 1888. 
Despite the elapse of sixteen years and the expected attenuation of 
aggregate-level relationships, defection rates disclose the election 
of 1888 to be a better precursor of political groupings in 1904 than 
is the election of 1896, or even the contiguous election of 1900. If 
the county-to-county alignments of voters in 1888 are used to anticipate 
the alignments of 1904, then 6 percent of the 1888 Democratic and non­
Democratic voters are estimated to have shifted between these two 
groups. For 1896 and 1904 the mean defection rate is 29 percent, and 
for 1900 and 1904 it is 12 percent. Remarkably, as compared to 1896, 
Table 1 reveals that 1888 more closely resembles every succeeding 
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election of the fourth party system. As compared to 1900, 1888 more 
closely resembles every succeeding election, with the exception of 
1908, when Bryan was nominated for a third and final time, and Woodrow 
Wilson's successful campaign for reelection in 1916. 
Table 1, however, is based only on measures of the vote 
actually cast, and given the substantial decline in voter turnout after 
1896, we might expect different patterns to emerge when party coalitions 
are portrayed as percentages of the potential voting population rather 
than of those who turned out to vote. Tables 2 and 3 report defection 
measures for, respectively, the Democratic and Republican percentages 
of the eligible adult population. Although, as would be expected, 
the tables reveal less overall stability than does Table 1, the temporal 
pattern of relationships is quite similar. For Democratic voting, 
the presidential election of 1888 is again a better precursor of 
results for 1904 than is either 1896 or 1900. For 1896, this 
domination continues through all subsequent elections. For 1900, the 
election of 1888 is a more accurate harbinger of voting patterns in 
1924 and 1928, but not in the elections from 1908 to 1920. For 
Republican voting, as disclosed in Table 3, 1888 is a better forerunner 
of 1904 than is 1896 and a slightly less accurate precursor than is 
1900. The election of 1888 is a better forerunner of all subsequent 
elections than is 1896, and, with the exception of 1916, yields results 
almost identical to those obtained for 1900. 
Thus the examination of pairwise relationships among elections 
fail to reveal 1896 as a critical contest that recast the sources of 
support for the nation's two major parties. Rather, following 1896, 
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party alignments were reminiscent of those which had prevailed during 
an earlier period. In the terminology of critical election theory, 
like a critical election with respect to the composition of voter 
coalitions and more like a "deviating" election that temporarily 
disrupted the prevailing alignments of voters. Not surprisingly, the 
ethnocultural historians who had proclaimed 1896 as a year of durable 
realignment had simply failed to look beyond the turn of the century: 
their analyses end abruptly in 1900. 
Even if we confine our attention to 1896 itself, the two-way 
movement of pietists and liturgicals, described by the ethnoculturalists, 
simply fails to emerge. Rather the distinctive coalitions of 1896 
arose, in large part, from a fusion of Cleveland's 1892 supporters 
with those of People's Party candidate James B. Weaver. The People's 
or Populist Party nominated Bryan in 1896 rather than running an 
independent candidate of their own, and most Populist voters fell into 
line. Table 4 reports the results of a regression analysis that 
estimates how both voters and nonvoters changed their behavior between 
1892 and 1896. The table shows the estimated proportion of Cleveland, 
Harrison, Weaver, and minor party and nonvoters who voted for Bryan, 
voted for McKinley, and either did not vote or voted for a minor party 
candidate. The results disclose that along with 90 percent of 
Cleveland's loyalists, 85 percent of those who opted for Populist 
candidate Weaver voted for Bryan in 1896. None of the former Weaver 
voters are estimated to have chosen McKinley in 1896. 
Table 4 also indicates the importance of new voters in 
creating the McKinley majority of 1896. McKinley was more than twice 
TABLE 4 
CHANGING ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR 1892-1896 
Voting for Bryan 
(Democrat/Peoples) 
Voting for Cleveland 91% 
(Democrat) 
Voting for Harrison 0% 
(Republican) 
Voting for Weaver 85% 
(People's) 
Nonvoting/Other 9% 
Voting for McKinley 
(Republican) 
6% 
97% 
0% 
20% 
Nonvoting/ 
Other 
3% 
3% 
15% 
70% 
17 
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as successful as his Democratic rival in recruiting previous nonvoters 
and minor party supporters. Again, contrary to the ethnocultural 
interpretation, Table 4 shows little switching of voters from one major 
party to the other. Only 6 percent of the 1892 Democratic voters are 
estimated to have voted for McKinley and no Harrison voters are 
estimated to have voted for Bryan. 
Not only was the election of 1896 not marked by a reshuffling 
of voters with different religious values, but the contest failed to 
introduce a new pluralism in which moralistic concerns would be replaced 
by a kind of politics in which parties sought to recruit diverse 
coalitions of voters through the merchandising of policy proposals 
tailored to their pragmatic interests. The era of an alleged fourth 
party system that followed 1896 witnesses an intensification of the 
prohibition campaign, the struggle over "100% Americanism," the adoption 
of the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act, the formation of the 
Second Klan, the Scopes Trial, and the religiously divisive election 
of 1928. 
According to Burnham, Republican victory in 1896 meant the 
domination of American politics and society by a business elite 
combined with new constraints on the policy options presented to 
voters. Yet he fails to show that the policy debates of the 1880s 
and early 1890s, centered on the tariff and free silver, were more 
threatening to captains of industry and finance than the policy concerns 
of the Progressive Era, including the graduated income tax, the 
regulation of private enterprise, restraints on labor injunctions, the 
eight-hour day, and social welfare legislation. Burnham is neither 
19 
able to cite examples of victories for the masses prior to 1896 nor to 
show how that contest connects with a reform movement that came five to 
twenty years later and often involved new groups of participants. 
Historians have demonstrated that large enterprise was of ten able to 
shape the policymaking process to serve its special needs during the 
early twentieth century, but no scholar has shown that business either 
began the drive for economic and social reform or had better than 
mixed success in manipulating policy change. 
Finally, confounding generational theories of realignment, 
the election of 1896 did not follow a period of "dealignment" in which 
voter attachments to parties and the political system were weak and 
unstable. The virtually equal balance of party power that prevailed 
prior to 1896 might seem to lend support to the dealignment thesis, but 
the thin margin of difference between the two parties reflected the 
strength, not the weakness, of party allegiances. For equipose in 
party competition arose from the reliable cadre of committed loyalists 
at the call of each major party. During the waning years of the third 
party system, moreover, voter turnout attained the highest levels ever 
achieved in federal elections. 
For the era of the New Deal realignment we fortunately have 
data on party registration, the best aggregate-level indicator of 
partisan attachments. For the five states that kept county-level 
registration statistics -- New York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, 
Oregon, and California -- Table 5 reports defection rates and correlation 
coefficients for the percentage of the potential electorate registering 
with the Democratic Party from 1926 to 1940. If 1928 were a critical 
* 
TABLE 5 
MEAN DEFECTION RATES AND CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: 
DEMOCRATIC REGISTRATION AS PERCENTAGE OF ADULT POPULATION: 
* 
1926-1940 
% Dem 1926 
% Dem 1928 
% Dem 1930 
% Dem 1932 
% Dem 1934 
% Dem 1936 
% Dem 1938 
% Dem 1940 
% Dem 19�6 
DF 'r 
0% 1 
% Dem 19�8 
DF r 
3% .86 
% Dem 19�0 
DF r 
1% .94 
S% .92 
0% 1 
% Dem 1932 
DF r2 
4% .63 
2% .83 
4% .83 
0% 1 
% Dem 19�4 
DF r 
13% .38 
8% .59 
9% .65 
7% .78 
0% 1 
% Dem 19�6 
DF r 
17% .29 
12% .53 
15% .53 
12% .66 
7% .83 
0% 1 
Five States: New York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, California, Oregon 
% Dem 1938 
DF r2 
24% .12 
16% .32 
15% .38 
13% .47 
4% • 78 
1% .81 
0% 1 
% Dem 19�0 
DF r 
23% .13 
15% .35 
16% .37 
10% .56 
4% .81 
1% .87 
2% .91 
0% 1 
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% Rep 1926 
% Rep 192B 
% Rep 1930 
% Rep 1932 
% Rep 1934 
% Rep 1936 
% Rep 1938 
% Rep 1940 
TABLE 6 
MEAN DEFECTION RATES AND CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: 
REPUBLICAN REGISTRATION AS PERCENTAGE OF ADULT POPULATION: 1926-1940* 
% Rep 1926 
DF i; 
0% 1 
% Rep 192B 
DF r2 
5% .79 
0% 1 
% Rep 1930 
DF r2 
1% .91 
3% .76 
0% 1 
% Rep 1932 
DF r2 
3% .7B 
1% .91 
5% .Bl 
0% 1 
% Rep 1934 
DF r2 
2% .Bl 
6% 
• 77 
6% .B6 
6% .B7 
0% 1 
% Rep 1936 
DF r2 
6% .B9 
6% .79 
14% .56 
6% .B4 
6% 
• 7B 
0% 1 
% Rep 193B 
DF r2 
1B% .52 
12% .75 
20% .54 
14% .7B 
14% 
• 
73 
9% .93 
0% 1 
% Rep 1940 
DF r2 
20% .3B 
12% .67 
23% .3B 
14% .70 
15% .59 
7% .91 
2% .93 
0% 1 
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election or the beginning of a realigning era, there should be a 
sharp break in the stability of the Democratic coalition in 1928, or 
more likely in 1930, the first registration period after the critical 
contest. No such pattern, however, emerges from the data. Instead, 
defection rates reveal extraordinary stability in the Democratic 
coalition from 1926 through 1932. For this period, defection rates 
for pairs of coalitions range from 1 percent to a high of but 5 percent 
(upper left-hand box). A departure from earlier alignments takes place 
only after 1932, during Franklin D. Roosevelt's first term in office. 
For pairs of party coalitions formed by selecting one year from 
1926-1932 and one from 1934-1940 (upper right-hand box), defection 
rates range from 7 percent to 24 percent, with 13 of 16 above 10 percent. 
For pairs of coalitions selected only from the period after 1932 
(lower right-hand box), defection rates range from 1 percent to 
7 percent, with all but one below 5 percent. 
For the percentage of potential voters registered as 
Republicans from 1926 to 1940, the discontinuity in party coalitions 
occurs two years after that for the Democratic groupings. Table 6 
reveals that for pairs of party coalitions from 1926 to 1934 (upper 
left-hand box), defection rates range from 1 percent to 6 percent; for 
pairs of coalitions formed by selecting one from 1926-1934 and one 
from 1936-1940 (upper right-hand box), defection rates range from 
6 percent to 23 percent, with 11 of 15 over 10 percent; and for pairs 
of coalitions from 1936-1940, defection rates range from 2 percent to 
17 9 percent. 
Contrary to a generational interpretation of the New Deal 
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realignment, these shifts in the composition of party coalitions 
resulted not primarily from the recruitment of new voters, but from 
the conversion of previous Republican loyalists. Table 7 discloses 
that a two-tiered realignment of party coalitions took place after 
the advent of economic depression. First, between 1930 and 1932 the 
Democrats were more successful than their Republican rivals both in 
recruiting new registrants and in retaining their previous loyalists. 
This development -- which may be termed the "depression effect" --
hiked the Democratic proportion of the two-party registration from 
31 percent to 40 percent, but did not substantially reorganize the 
social and economic composition of the Democratic coalition. Second, 
between 1932 and 1934, the Democrats converted a substantial portion 
of previous Republican loyalists (12 percent) while retaining most of 
their own registrants (93 percent). This development -- which may be 
termed the "Roosevelt effect" -- both increased the Democratic 
proportion of the two-party registration from 40 percent to 48 percent 
and reshuffled the composition of the Democratic coalition. 
As in the 1890s, political change in the 1930s began only 
after the advent of depression and was not rooted in the politics of 
an earlier period. The election of 1928 was notable primarily for 
sparking religious strife between Catholics and Protestants and did not 
contribute to the later formation of the Roosevelt coalition. 18 
America's Great Depression was a major discontinuity in the nation's 
electoral history. Realignment of the American electorate occurred 
neither in response to generational change nor in reaction to the unmet 
needs of those sharing least in the prosperity of the 1920s. Changes 
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TABLE 7 
CHANGES IN VOTER REGISTRATION: 1926-1934* 
Democratic 1928 ReEublican 1928 Not Registering 1928 
Democratic 1926 90% 1% 10% 
Republican 1926 2% 96% 2% 
Not Registering 1926 10% 16% 75% 
Democratic 1930 ReEublican 1930 Not Registering 1930 
Democratic 1928 84% 1% 15% 
Republican 1928 1% 90% 9% 
Not Registering 1928 1% 1% 98% 
Democratic 1932 ReEublican 1932 Not Registering 1932 
Democratic 1930 98% 1% 1% 
Republican 1930 1% 93% 7% 
Not Registering 1930 16% 11% 74% 
Democratic 1934 ReEublican 1934 Not Registering 1934 
Democratic 1932 93% 5% 2% 
Republican 1932 12% 84% 5% 
Not Registering 1932 2% 0% 98% 
*Five States: New York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, California, Oregon 
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in partisan loyalties did not reflect the redemption of claims pent up 
during the 1920s, but the creation of new demands that were not being 
met during the crisis. The situation from 1929 to 1932 was strikingly 
similar to that of the 1890s, when the Cleveland administration failed 
to solve an economic emergency. The political demands of the 1930s 
called not for the recasting of American society, but for the relief 
of distress and the restoration of opportunity. As Robert H. Zieger 
noted in a 1976 review essay, "New Deal reforms were partial, frugally 
funded, closely in line with prevailing conceptions about the role of 
government, and extremely sensitive to the rhetoric of decentralization 
and local control to the disadvantage of minorities, working people, 
19 and the poor." 
As in the 1890s, the realignment of the 1930s did not end a 
period of "dealignment. " Contrary to the instability in party control 
of government that should be evident during dealignments, the 
Republicans controlled every branch of the national government from 
1921 to 1931. Although voter turnout was low during the landslide 
elections of 1920 and 1924, the election of 1928 proved that an 
exciting contest could still produce a substantial turnout. Moreover, 
low rates of turnout during most of the 1920s were part of a trend 
that began immediately after 1896 rather than subsequent to the coming 
of age of voters untouched by conflicts of the 1890s. 
Nonetheless, political change in the 1930s differed from 
that of the 1890s in several important respects. First, shifts in 
party power were far more substantial in the 1930s than in the 1890s. 
The realignment of the 1890s ended a twenty-year period of mixed control 
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of the national government and began a fifteen-year period of united 
Republican control. The realignment of the 1930s ended ten years of 
solid Republican domination and introduced fifteen years of unbroken 
Democratic rule. Second, the Republicans of the 1890s gained strength 
primarily from the recruitment of new voters, whereas the Democrats of 
the 1930s succeeded both in winning new loyalists and in converting 
the Republican faithful. Third, the realignment of the 1930s, unlike 
that of the 1890s, reorganized the social and economic composition of 
party coalitions. Fourth, only the realignment of the 1930s directly 
resulted in a major redirection of national policy. 
The main features of the New Deal policy system, however, 
were put into place during FDR's first term and did not require 
extended control of government by the Democratic Party. Indeed, during 
the eras of alleged policy inertia between critical elections, 
innovative leaders have engineered significant and lasting changes in 
the policies of government. Examples include the reform measures of 
Woodrow Wilson's first term and the civil rights, welfare, and 
regulatory legislation of Lyndon Johnson's administration. 
What remains from the critical election model is only the 
finding particular parties have dominated government for certain periods 
of time. For presidential administrations, at least, this phenomena 
can be explained without reference to party identification or any 
"long-term" force purported to extend beyond the interval between 
administrations. The physicist and mathematician V. I. Keilis-Borok 
and I have used the methodology of pattern recognition to fashion a 
situational logic of presidential elections that explains victory or 
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defeat for incumbent parties by reference only to circumstances that 
arise in the four years between campaigns. 20 Our analysis shows that 
the outcome of elections follows the dynamics of certain simple, 
integral parameters that are more sensitive than party identification 
to changes occurring during the four years of a presidential term. 
But the parameters transcend the decisions of individual voters, the 
movement of voter blocs, the unique issues of an election, and the 
strategems of campaigns. Thus the presidency is up for grabs every 
four years according to a logic that transcends either party allegiances 
or the turbulence of particular campaigns. 
The parameters used to diagnose political situations are 
obtained from yes or no answers to the twelve questions listed in 
Table 8. This questionnaire can be answered prior to the coming 
election; most questions can be answered definitively by the time both 
major parties have selected their nominees. Each answer reflects 
diverse features of complex situations that may be both causes and 
symptoms of the prospects for incumbent and challenging parties. 
Social unrest, for instance, may indicate dissatisfaction with the 
status quo while itself becoming a reason for rejecting the incumbent 
party; the incumbent party, in turn, may attempt to exploit disorder 
to discredit the opposition and rally supporters. Answers to several 
of the questions, notably 8-12, require judgments about historical 
circumstance that are frequently put forth by historians but are not 
reduced to precise numerical criteria. Pattern recognition offers a 
systematic means of determining whether judgments of these matters 
yields an accurate division of presidential elections into victories 
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TABLE 8 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
The answers, given in brackets, favor the victory of incumbent party 
according to analysis of the whole data set in Table 2 (last kernel 
in Table 3). 
1. Has the incumbent party been in office more than a single term? [no] 
2. Did the incumbent party gain more than 50% of the vote cast in the 
previous election?* [yes] 
3. Was there major third party activity during the election year? [no] 
4. Was there a serious contest for the nomination of the incumbent 
party candidate? [no] 
5. Was the incumbent party candidate the sitting president? [yes] 
6. Was the election year a time of recession or depression? [no] 
7.  Was the yearly mean per-capita rate of growth in real GNP during 
the incumbent administration equal to or greater than the mean rate 
of the previous eight years and equal to or greater than 1%?** [yes] 
8. Did the incumbent president initiate major changes in national 
policy? [yes] 
9. Was there major social unrest in the nation during the incumbent 
administration? [no] 
10. Was the incumbent administration tainted by major scandal or 
failure? [no] 
11. Is the incumbent party candidate charismatic or a national hero? [yes] 
12. Is the challenging party candidate charismatic or a national 
hero? [no] 
*Rounded to the nearest percent. 
**Prior to the 1890s, the available statistics are approximate. 
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by incumbent or challenging parties. 
When the questionnaire is applied to all American presidential 
elections from 1860 to 1980, the algorithm of pattern recognition yields 
the set of yes/no answers that are most favorable to victory by the 
incumbent party (these answers are listed in Table 8). These 
preferential responses to the questionnaire are compared to the actual 
answers for a given election, producing from zero to twelve discrepancies; 
the fewer the number of discrepancies the more favorable the situation 
for victory by the incumbent party. Taken together, the answers to 
the questionnaire divide elections into incumbent and challenging 
party victories as shown in Table 9. Whenever there are fewer than 
five discrepancies from the answers listed on Ta�le 8, the incumbent 
party retained control of the White House. Whenever there are more 
than five discrepancies, the challenging party triumphed. Only three 
elections attained the indeterminate number of five discrepancies. 
Two of them are victories by the incumbent party and one -- the 
election of 1912 in which ex-president Roosevelt split the Republican 
party21 -- is a victory for the challenging party. 
Considering the period following the realignment of 1896, 
critical election theory would incorrectly anticipate the result of 
eight of twenty-one presidential elections; in the contests of 1912, 
1916, 1932, 1952, 1956, 1968, 1972, and 1980 the minority party gained 
the presidency. Our situational logic, in contrast, generates no 
incorrect predictions and only two indeterminate verdicts -- for the 
presidential elections of 1908 and 1912. For the years following the 
death of FDR in 1945, critical election theory incorrectly forecasts 
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five of nine presidential elections; the situational model correctly 
anticipates all nine contests. 
The results presented in this broad survey of electoral 
realignment suggest that critical election theory imposes a false 
mechanism on the rich variety of American political history. The 
realignments of both the 1890s and the 1930s arose from the failure 
of incumbent administrations to cope with economic depression rather 
than from the irresistable accumulation of unmet political demands . 
In neither case did the challenging party's triumph follow a period 
of dealignment, resolve the key conflicts of the previous political 
era, nor precede a period of policy quiescence that lasted until the 
next critical election. In both cases the victorious party also 
benefited from a favorable political environment that lasted at least 
through the next two presidential contests. Moreover, despite these 
elements of similarity, each post-Civil War realignment followed a 
distinctive process of political change • 
After the economic slide of 1893, voters turned away from 
the incumbent party, first in the congressional elections of 1894 and 
second in the presidential contest of 1896. Yet McKinley defeated not 
the legatees of the Cleveland administration, but the Bryan insurgents 
who had seized control of the Democratic Party at the 1896 convention. 
This Republican triumph neither brought to the fore America's toiling 
masses nor installed in power an economic elite somehow excluded from 
governance during the third party system. Instead, McKinley's victory 
warded off a threat to politics as usual that arose only because of 
the very economic crisis that made 1896 a Republican year. 
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Without becoming an innovator of new policy, McKinley 
profited. from a newly rising economy, a "splendid little war," domestic 
tranquility, and party unity. A diagnosis of the political situation 
in 1900 reveals only two discrepancies from the twelve traits favorable 
to an incumbent victory (Table 8). With Bryan's defeat in 1896 and 
1900, voter groupings again came to resemble those of the 1880s; 
McKinley never succeeded in winning over the Democratic loyalists 
necessary for reorganizing the coalitional bases of the two parties. 
In addition, after 1896, voter turnout began a steady decline that 
was not reversed until the dramatic confrontation between Al Smith 
and Herbert Hoover in 1928. Contrary to the generational version of 
realignment theory, critical elections of the 1890s seem actually to 
have weakened voters' attachment to the political system. 
In 1932, Roosevelt defeated an incumbent president burdened 
with personal responsibility for three years of unrelieved economic 
distress. Unlike McKinley, Roosevelt did not experience a favorable 
turn in the business cycle that coincided with his arrival in the 
White House. To combat depression and reform the economy, FDR 
instituted important, if nonradical, changes in national policy. For 
the first time since the Civil War, Roosevelt's policy innovations 
and political leadership produced major shifts in the composition of 
party coalitions. His campaign for reelection in 1936 also 
contributed to the rising trend in voter turnout that had begun in 
1928. Once FDR himself passed from the scene, however, the Democrats 
were able to win only four of nine presidential contests between 1948 
and 1980. 
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Examination of the historical record also suggests several 
broad guidelines for interpreting the election of 1980. First, even if 
1980 presages a durable redirection of American politics, realignment 
in the 1980s will likely exhibit distinctive features that cannot be 
anticipated by prevailing theory. Crucial differences between what 
happened in the 1890s and the 1930s show the deficiencies of a static 
model -- like that incorporated in critical election theory -- that 
imposes a common cyclical pattern on the process of political change. 
In 1980, for instance, unlike either 1896 or 1932, voter turnout 
continued a long-term decline, dropping to but 51 percent of the 
eligible electorate. In 1980, moreover, the triumphant candidate was 
weakest amongst the youngest voters participating in the election. 
Second, the results of a single election or even a short 
series of elections do not necessarily indicate whether the newly 
advantaged party will be able to consolidate its gains. The New Deal 
realignment, for example, was a two-stage process that required not 
only the rejection of Hoover's approach to combatting depression, but 
also the successful leadership of FDR. In other instances, political 
turnabouts even more dramatic than that of 1980 have failed to produce 
lasting change in the control of government. Between 1910 and 1912, 
for instance, the Democrats recaptured. the White House, transformed 
a 219 to 172 deficit in the House to a 291 to 127 lead, and turned 
around a 61 to 32 deficit in the Senate to a 51 to 44 lead. By 1920, 
however, the Republicans had regained complete control of the national 
government, a position they would maintain until after the Great Crash 
of 1929. 
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Third, irrespective of the results of upcoming elections, 
Ronald Reagan and a sympathetic Congress may generate lasting changes 
in American governance. Like those of Wilson's first term, the 
initiatives of Reagan's administration may alter the policymaking 
context for whomever comes to control the national government. Even 
if the Democrats should regain domination of Congress and the 
presidency in 1984, they may find themselves functioning in a very 
different environment from that of the 1970s. Thus durable change in 
government policy need not depend on a realignment that follows the 
precepts of critical election theory. 
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